ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
The secret handshakes (SH) are an important research subject in the field of privacy-preserving authentication protocols. It is a cryptographic protocol introduced by Balfanz et al. [2] in 2003, which allows two members of a specific group to authenticate themselves secretly in the sense that each party reveals his affiliation to the other only if the other party is also a member of the same group. They also introduced the SH with roles, so that a group member A can specify a role another group member B must have in order to successfully complete the handshake. As in secret handshakes group members can play different roles within a group, and can authenticate themselves in these roles. For example, a CBI agent A wants to discover and communicates with other agent B, but they don't want to reveal their affiliations to non-agents. If B is not a CBI agent, then the protocol should not help B in determining whether A is a CBI agent or not, and vice versa. In other words, the SH scheme enables two members who belong to same group G to authenticate each other in a way that hides their affiliation from all others.
Related Work
The secret handshakes scheme by Balfanz adapts the non interactive key agreement protocol of Sakai et al. [12] based on bilinear maps. The scheme is secure under the BDH assumption. It uses one time credentials to achieve the unlinkability, which means that each user must store a large number of credentials. In 2004 Castelluccia et al. [3] constructed two party secret handshakes scheme with one group by using CA-Oblivious encryption. This solution is secure under CDH assumption. Both these schemes are secure in the random oracle model.
Ateniese et al. [1] introduced SH with dynamic matching which is the first efficient unlinkable SH scheme, allowing to verify the presence of properties different from the user's own. Their scheme treats a set of members with identical attribute as an entity instead of different individual. It is essentially a group key agreement scheme between different sub-group members in a large group environment. Property credentials are issued by a certification authority (CA). This scheme is somewhat in between SH and secures matchmaking protocol.
Sorniotti et al. [13] also proposed a similar concept of dynamic controlled matching allowing an authorized prover to convince an authorized verifier that she owns a property. Both schemes allow more flexible types of secret handshakes. Users holding credentials for different properties can conduct successful secret handshakes; if credentials match the other user's matching references. The difference between the two schemes is the control that the CA retains over the matching ability. However, neither of them supports revocation of credentials. Sorniotti and Molva [14] presented an SH scheme with revocation which allows a user to prove to a verifier possession of a credential. Credentials can be revoked simply by publishing a value in a revocation list.
Lu et al. [9] introduced secure same symptom based SH scheme which allows a patient to securely share a PHI (Patient Health Information) and conduct extensive simulations to evaluate its efficiency in terms of PHI reporting delay. Ryu et al. [11] introduced unlinkable SH for anonymous communications allowing two arbitrary communication parties with the same role in either one single group or multiple groups to privately authenticate each other. Recently Kulshrestha et al. [8] points out that Ryu et al. scheme is insecure to key compromise impersonation attack. Wen et al. [17] proposed an unlinkable SH with fuzzy matching for social network, it supports more flexible threshold based appropriate matching under the multiple groups environment which is not limited to authenticate between members from the same group and which is secure under the decisional bilinear Diffie -Hellman assumption.
Vergnaud [16] constructed a SH scheme using RSA signature and Zhou et al. [24] constructed a SH scheme using ElGamal and DSA signature. Both the schemes rely on random oracles for their security and uses one time credential to insure that handshake protocol performed by the same party cannot be linked. Xu -Yung [20] proposed SH scheme that achieves unlinkability with reusable credentials. They introduced the concept of k-anonymous secret handshakes where k is an adjustable parameter indicating the desired anonymity assurance. Huang -Cao [5] in 2009 proposed an efficient unlinkable secret handshakes scheme and claimed that scheme achieves affiliation hiding and unlinkability. However Su [15] and Youn -Park [22] proved that Huang -Cao scheme has a design flaw and is insecure.
Gu -Xue [4] in 2011 proposed an improved secret handshakes scheme with unlinkability based on the Huang -Cao scheme. Yoon [21] in 2011 points out that Gu -Xue scheme is insecure to key compromise impersonation attack and cannot provide master key forward secrecy. Jarecki and Liu [6] proposed a practical unlinkable secret handshakes scheme that supports both traceability and revocation with reusable credentials. Resorting to group signature with message recovery, Kawai et al. [7] proposed a conditional unlinkable secret handshakes scheme. Wen et al. [19] proposed a new generic framework for constructing two-party secret handshakes schemes from ID-based message recovery signatures. Inspired by Kawai et al. scheme [7] , Wen et al. [18] also proposed unlinkable secret handshakes from message recovery signature.
In this paper we propose a new SH scheme with dynamic matching from bilinear pairing. Our scheme is constructed from Bilinear Inverse Diffie-Hellman. Our proposed SH scheme is constructed using Ateniese et al. [1] . Our scheme is based on ZSS signature [23] and is inspired by identity based authenticated key agreement by McCullagh et al. [10] . We also give security proofs for the new scheme in the random oracle model.
Organization:
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3 recalls the preliminaries related to our work. Section 4 describes definitions and security requirements of a secret handshakes scheme. In Section 5 we give our secret handshakes scheme with dynamic matching based on ZSS signature. Section 6 gives the security analysis of our proposed scheme. In section 7 we discuss efficiency issues. Finally we draw our conclusion in Section 8.
Preliminaries

Bilinear Pairing:
Let and be two cyclic groups of the same large prime order . is denoted as an additive group and as a multiplicative group. Let denote a generator of . A Bilinear Pairing is a function ∶ × → with the following properties:
e can be efficiently computed in polynomial time.
Some Mathematical problems in
, are described as follows:
 Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem: The CDH problem is to compute abP when given P, aP and bP for some , ∈ * .
 Inverse Computational Diffie-Hellman (ICDH) problem:
The ICDH problem is to compute a −1 P when given P and aP for some ∈ * .
 Modified Inverse Computational Diffie-Hellman (mICDH) problem: The mICDH problem is to compute ( + ) when given bP, P, aP and (a+b)P for some , ∈ * .
 Bilinear Diffie Hellman Problem (BDH):
The BDH problem is to compute ( , ) when given , , and for some , , ∈ * .
 Bilinear Inverse Diffie Hellman Problem (BIDH):
The BIDH problem is to compute ( , )
when given , and for some , ∈ * .
 Modified Bilinear Inverse Diffie-Hellman (mBIDH) Problem: The mBIDH problem is to compute ( , ) ( ) when given , , and for some , , ∈ * .
ZSS Signature:
ZSS Signature was proposed by Zhang et al. [23] in 2004. The signature scheme consists of four algorithms a parameter generation algorithm ParamGen, a key generation algorithm KeyGen, a signature generation algorithm Sign and a signature verification algorithm Ver.
Signature scheme is as follows:
ParamGen:
Given a security parameter the algorithm generates the system parameter 〈 , , , , , 〉 where and are the two cyclic groups of same order q, and P is a generator of , e is the bilinear map and ∶ {0,1} * → * is the cryptographic hash function.
KeyGen:
Randomly selects ∈ * as the secret key and computes = as the public key.
Sign:
Given a secret key , and a message m, computes the signature = ( )
.
Ver:
Given a public key , a message m, and a signature S, verifies if
The verification works because
Secret Handshakes (SH) Scheme
In SH scheme there exists three entities for a group G, a user who may or may not be a member of G, a user who belongs to the group and a group administrator (GA) who creates and adds members into the group, and issues certificate in a form of secret key to members.
A secret handshakes scheme consists of the following algorithms:
This is an algorithm run by a group administrator GA, which takes params as input and generates a key pair (group public key) and (group secret key).
Add User:
This is an algorithm between a user U and the GA of some group. It takes params and GA's secret as input and output a public key and secret key for U and makes U a valid member of the group.
Handshake:
This is the authentication protocol. It is executed between users A and B, who want to authenticate each other on the public inputs , and params. The private input of each party is their secret credential and the output of the protocol for either party is either 'reject' or 'accept' (A and B belong to the same group if and only if the output is 'accept'). At the end of the protocol, if A's requirements for B are matched by B's credentials and B's requirements for A are matched by A's credentials, A and B authenticate by sharing a common key otherwise such authentication fails.
A secret handshakes scheme must have the following security properties:
Completeness/ Correctness:
If two honest members A, B belonging to the same group and run handshake protocol with valid credentials of their and group public keys, then both members always output "accept".
Impersonator Resistance:
An adversary not satisfying the rules of the handshake protocol is unable to successfully authenticate to an honest member.
Detector Resistance:
An adversary not satisfying the rules of the handshake protocol cannot decide whether some honest party satisfies the rule or not.
Unlinkability:
It is not feasible to tell whether two execution of the handshake protocol were performed by the same party or not, even if both them were successful.
Proposed Scheme
In this section we propose a secret handshakes scheme with dynamic matching based on of ZSS signature [23] . Our scheme uses same technique as Ateniese et al. [1] .
Create Group:
The GA inputs a security parameter k into BDH parameter generator which returns Params: 〈 , , , , , , 〉 as defined in section 3.
Add User:
For a user U, GA computes = ( ∥ ) where group is the group identity of the user U and is its role. It then issues public key as = ( + ) and secret key as = ( + ) .
Handshake:
Suppose A with secret on the identity and role and B with secret on the identity and role engage in a handshake protocol. They should successfully complete the protocol if the group and the role specified by A for B matches B's credentials and group and role specified by B for A matches A's credentials.
The protocol proceeds as follows:
1.
A chooses unique random nonce ∈ * and sends
= ( | ) + ,
where is the role and is the group identity that B must have in order to complete the handshake.
2.
Similarly, B chooses unique random nonce ∈ * and sends
= ( | ) + ,
where is the role and is the group identity that A must have in order to complete the handshake.
3.
Using the knowledge of x and what A just received from B, A computes the following key:
= ( , ) and = ( , ).
4.
Using the knowledge of and what B just received from A, B computes the following key: = ( , ) and = ( , ) . If = , = , = , and = , then at the end of the handshake both A and B share a secret key = ( , ) .
Correctness:
If the participants satisfy the rules of the handshakes protocol, they will successfully share a common key. For correctness of scheme we show that the shared key that A and B computes the same. 
Security
An adversary A who can forge a valid ZSS signature can surely attack the SH protocol just as an honest member. Hence the probability to attack SH scheme cannot be smaller than the probability to forge a valid ZSS signature.
Group Member Impersonation:
For an adversary A we define a member impersonation game, during which A is allowed to corrupt users of her choice, but not GA.
Create:
Adversary A setup a new oracle in the system that has public key and secret key for some users. We denote by the users that A controls.
Selects:
Adversary A selects a target user such that ∉ with whom she would like to communicate and wants to detect a target role under which she wants to detect a target user .
Interaction:
Adversary A interacts with where ∉ in which case may be assumed that he interacts with legitimate user. Since in this scheme during the handshake sends only ( ( ∥ )) + , ∈ * , where ∥ is the expected identity of the other end, this message can be generated by anyone. A can impersonate , if cannot distinguish between A's message and the real execution of the handshake protocol.
Challenge:
We claim that at the end of the interaction A cannot compute the same key that obtains because for calculating the shared key she must possess the secret key which corresponds to the same identity or requirement that want, because even knowing the public key or requirement send by , ( + ) the probability to calculate the secret key ( + ) which correspond to a specific identity is negligible.
= [
] < is negligible.
Impersonation Resistance:
If A never corrupts a member of the target group with role then ∩ , = ∅. The secret handshakes scheme is said to ensure impersonation resistance if is negligible for all A.
Group Member Detection:
For an adversary A we define a member detection game, in which A can corrupt users of her choice, the goal of A to learns, how to identify member of a certain group.
Create:
Select:
Challenge:
An adversary A unable to distinguish between and simulator R because in our proposed scheme during the handshake sends only ( ( ∥ )) + , ∈ * , where ∥ is the expected identity of the other end. This message can be generated by anyone. Therefore A cannot determine whether it was sent by or a simulator R either A interacts with or a simulator R. Specifically, to answer a query the oracle flips a fair coin ∈ {0,1}; if the answer is 0, it outputs the target user , and if the answer is 1, it outputs a random simulator. A then must decide whether C is 0 or 1; call this prediction . A's advantage in distinguish the target user and random simulator in this game, is given by
Detection Resistance:
Let be the group to which belongs with role in and suppose A never corrupts member of with role the secret handshake scheme is said to ensure detection resistance if ∩ , = ∅. Then is negligible for all A.
Unlinkability:
The property of unlinkability requires that it should be computationally hard for an adversary to link transmitted message by the same party. For an adversary A we define a linking game, during which A is allowed to corrupt users of her choice, but not GA.
Create:
Adversary A setup a new oracle in the system that has secret key for some users. We denote by the users that A controls.
Interaction:
Adversary A interacts with users of her choice and obtains secrets for some users .
Selects:
Adversary A selects a target user such that ∉ with whom she would like to communicate and engage in handshake protocols with .
Challenge:
Given a transmitted messages X and Y for secret handshakes, the only way for an adversary to distinguish the messages by the same or different parties is to compute a type of shared secrets = ( , ).
In our proposed scheme during the handshake user send only, ( ( ∥ )) + , ∈ * , where ∥ is the expected identity of the other end. Specifically, to answer a query the oracle flips a fair coin = {0,1}; if the answer is 0, it output a handshake protocol with the same user, and if the answer is 1, it outputs a different member which is not corrupted by adversary. A then must decide whether b is 0 or 1; call this prediction . A's advantage in linking the target user is given by
If
be the group to which belongs with role in and suppose A never corrupts member of with role and a GA of then adversary A has at most negligible linking advantage.
Theorem:
The proposed SH scheme is a secure SH scheme with dynamic matching assuming that BIDH assumption hold.
Proof:
All queries by the adversary A now pass through simulator S.
Create:
When A corrupts users by querying their private keys, S answer those queries as follows:
S chooses ∈ * creates public keys as = − = + and computes the private key as .
Select:
Once A declared the target user , simulator S answers as public key. Since S does not know , it cannot calculate the correct private key for the user .
Interaction:
Simulator needs to send to A message for . S chooses for an unknown which is ( ), where ∈ * . In response it will get a value from as the value . This is genuine value from and S does not influence it.
Compute:
Now the key can be computed by ( , )
S must have non-negligible advantage in calculating ( , ) , because S does not know private key of . S sets = ( , )
. S can calculate ( , ) , since it know and calculate = ( , )
. So S can solve BIDH as compute ( , ) = .
Hence S can successfully break the BIDHP with non negligible probability .
Performance Analysis
In this section we compare our construction with Atenniese et al. [1] 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a secret handshakes scheme with dynamic matching, in which each party can specify both the group and the role the other must have in order to complete the handshake. Our secret handshakes scheme is inspired by the McCullagh et al. identity based authenticated key agreement protocol. We constructed the scheme using the technique of Ateniese et al. Our scheme is based on ZSS signature and is secure under BIDH assumption. Since the credential in our scheme is a short signature proposed by Zhang et al. [23] , the proofs of completeness, IR and DR can be easily deduced from Zhang et al. signature scheme [23] .In terms of computation cost our scheme is as good as Ateniese [1] 
